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BARBARA B. UZELAC'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Barbara B. Uzelac ("Barbara") petitions the Court for rehearing. Barbara will 
show that the Court's decision violates the law of case doctrine, misstates the record, 
misstates the standard of review, and misapplies Utah law to the undisputed facts before 
the Court. Barbara attaches a copy of the Court's opinion as Exhibit A ("Uzelac II") and 
a copy of the first appellate decision as Exhibit B ("Uzelac I"). 
1. The Court's Decision Violates the Law of the Case Doctrine. 
a. The Court Denied the Motion to Reconvey the Homestead on the Basis 
of an Argument that Was Required to be Raised in Uzelac I but Was 
Not Raised There. 
Barbara appealed the trial court's September 27, 2003 Minute Entry in Uzelac I. 
Notice of Appeal, R. 1366-67. After stating that "Barbara is a Both a Beneficiary and A 
Claimant Against the Estate," she asked the Court of Appeals to reverse the Minute Entry. 
Appellant's Brief at 13,20-21. She specifically noted that a reversal of the trial court's 
interpretation of the Antenuptial Agreement without a reversal of the Minute Entry would 
leave her without a remedy because any new motion to recover the Homestead would be 
untimely. Appellant's Reply Brief at 15. The personal representative could have argued 
that reversal of the Minute Entry would be inappropriate if the Court found Barbara was 
only a devisee. He could have argued that Barbara's Motion was brought against the 
estate and not against the Children. He could have raised other arguments. But he did 
not do so. Appellee's Brief in Uzelac I at 24-26. Uzelac I reversed the Minute Entry 
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even though it expressly held that Barbara could not proceed as a creditor. Uzelac I at 
imi4,2i. 
As discussed in greater detail below, on remand, the trial court held Barbara's 
Motion to Recover the Homestead was procedurally defective as being "against the 
estate" and not against the Children. R. 1755. This Court denied Barbara's motion 
because she identified herself as a creditor in her motion. Uzelac II at ^[15-17. Either 
argument was required to be raised in the first appeal. See DeBry v. Cascade Enterprises, 
935 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah 1997) ("Those issues were ripe for appeal at that time, and the 
Debrys' failure to raise them [in their first] appeal resulted in a waiver of their right to 
raise them at a later time.")1 In fact, any argument that should have been raised in the 
first appeal in favor of affirming the Minute Entry has been waived. 
b. The Court Used the "Marital Estate Analogue" that was Expressly 
Rejected by the Majority in Uzelac I. 
In paragraphs 1, 2, 7, 8,15, and 18, the Court analyzed the case on the basis of a 
"marital estate analogue" that it inaccurately stated Uzelac I had adopted in paragraphs 
20-21. Uzelac II, [^7. Paragraphs 19-20 of Uzelac I used two divorce court decisions 
interpreting the term "acquired by the parties" to interpret that same term in the 
Antenuptial Agreement. On the other hand, Judge Orme developed the "marital estate 
1
 As intervenors, the Children are bound by the procedural and substantive history 
of the case as it existed at the time of intervention. Lima v. Chambers, 657 P.2d 279, 285 
(Utah 1982). Thus, any claim that was or could have been resolved in the first appeal 
may not be raised by the Children now. 
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analogue" in his concurring opinion. Uzelac I at ffi[27-30. After Barbara petitioned for 
rehearing, the majority rejected Judge Orme's marital estate analysis. 
We do not concur in Judge Ormefs concurring opinion. The issue discussed 
therein was not before the court, we did not address it, and it should not be 
considered the law of the case. 
Uzelac 1,1J21, fn.2. See also ^8, footnote 1 (where the Court wonders why neither party 
used the "marital estate analogue" and states it will not do so). Using an analysis 
disavoved by the majority in Uzelac I violates the law of the case doctrine. Thurston v. 
Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037-39 (Utah 1995).2 
Relying on its "marital estate analogue," the Court adds the word "marital" to the 
Antenuptial Agreement. Uzelac I rejected the trial court's addition of the word "together" 
after "property acquired by the parties" on the basis that the court could not add words to 
the agreement. Uzelac 1,1Hfl6 and 19. Now Uzelac II adds the word "marital" before 
"property acquired by the parties." See \ 1, \2, f7, [^8 fn.l, f 18, \\9. This violates Utah 
law and the law of the case doctrine. Uzelac I, ffi[16 and 19. 
Furthermore, by using the "marital estate analogue," the Court adopted the precise 
argument, rejected in Uzelac I, made by the personal representative in support of 
affirming the Minute Entry. The personal representative argued: 
Barbara's assertion that reversal of the trial court's interpretation of the Ante 
Nuptial Agreement would mandate a reversal of the Minute Order 
2
 The Court could conduct the analysis required by Thurston v. Box Elder County 
to determine if its prior decision should be reversed. Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1037-39. 
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approving the Deed overreaches. Even if Barbara were to prevail on her 
interpretation of paragraph 5 of the Ante Nuptial Agreement, this would 
entitle her to receive only property acquired during the marriage. Property 
owned by Lou prior to the marriage such as the real property conveyed via 
the Deed would still pass to his daughters under both Barbara's and the 
Personal Representative's interpretations of the paragraph 1 of the Ante 
Nuptial Agreement. 
Appellee's Brief at 26, fn. 3 (emphasis in original); compare Uzelac II [^18. 
Violating the law of the case doctrine has led the Court to misapprehend the status 
of the Homestead. The estate held the Homestead from Louis' death (November 6, 1999) 
until the deed of distribution was executed on May 19, 2003. As expressly agreed by 
Louis and Barbara in paragraph 1 of the Antenuptial Agreement, the Homestead became 
part of "Louis' estate." There was a third parcel of "premarital" Homestead property that 
was sold and used to pay estate expenses. R.1580, fn. 1. Because of the specific devise 
of the life estate to Barbara, the remainder interest was available to pay any general 
devise. Utah Code Ann. §75-3-902(1); Restatement (Third) of Property; Wills and Other 
Donative Transfers, §5.1 Classification Of Devises (1999). The Court expressly held 
Barbara's $230,660.90 devise was a general devise and the Children also took as general 
devisees. f21. The Court's holding that the estate had no right to the Homestead is 
legally and factually inaccurate. Utah Code Ann. §75-3-101 (estate devolves subject to 
administration); Uzelac II at f 18. Finally, the Court is not adjudicating marital property 
rights. It is interpreting a 1976 contract. "All property, whether real, personal or mixed 
acquired by the parties" would include acquisitions during the marriage of non-marital 
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property (e.g. inheritances or earnings on marital property) as defined in post 1990 
divorce cases. 
c. The Court Improperly Treated the Vacated September 27, 2003 
Minute Entry as an Existing and Controlling Order. 
Uzelac I expressly vacated the September 27, 2003. Uzelac I ^ [21. Upon remand 
the trial court was required to accept that ruling, and on appeal, this Court was required to 
accept that ruling, subject only to the Thurston v. Box Elder County analysis. Thurston, 
892 P.2d at 1037-39. While the trial court could (and did) enter a new order denying the 
Motion to Reconvey the Homestead, it could not resurrect the Minute Entry. 
Although the Minute Entry had been vacated, the Court in paragraphs 6, 16, and 17 
treats the Minute Entry as a valid and existing order. [^6 (discussing legal reasoning of 
Minute Entry), \\6 (Barbara filed her second notice of appeal 3 years after vacated 
Minute Entry); \\1 (holding that the vacated Minute Entry was a final appealable order 
under Harward v. Voorhees, 366 P.2d 977 (Utah 1961)). Doing so violated the law of the 
case doctrine. 
2. Uzelac II Misstates the Record. 
a. Barbara Did Not File her Motion to Reconvey the Homestead "Against 
the Estate." 
In concurring in the trial court's holding that Barbara "clearly" did not file a 
proceeding against the Children to recover the Homestead, the Court analyzed an issue 
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not addressed by the trial court: whether Barbara had properly presented her claim 
against the estate. Uzelac II, ^ fl5. The September 27, 2003 Minute Entry stated: 
As an initial matter, issues pertaining to an interpretation of the Ante 
Nuptial Agreement and to Uzelac's "damages theory" are the proper subject 
of the October 7, 2003, trial or have been previously addressed in the 
Court's Order on the Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment. That said, the 
sole issue currently before this Court is whether a basis exists for the Court 
to order decedent's daughters to return the distributed property. 
R. 1080-81. Contrary to its August 10, 2006 ruling, R. 1755, the trial court's Minute 
Entry recognized that Barbara's motion was filed against the daughters. It further 
recognized that Barbara's pending creditor's claim was not ripe for adjudication. The 
trial court did not hold Barbara's pending creditor's claim barred by the affirmative 
defense of limitations until the trial held on October 7, 2003. R.1340-48. 
In its August 10, 2006 ruling, the trial court did not base its decision on Barbara's 
identification of herself as a creditor. 
5. The daughters were granted the right to intervene on November 17, 
2005, in order to respond to the claim for recovery made by Mrs. Uzelac, 
which claim had been made against the Estate. 
6. It is clear that no proceedings against either of the distributees of the 
real property requested by to be recovered has been instituted. The claim of 
Mrs. Uzelac that her claim as a creditor of the Estate was sufficient to put 
the daughters on notice is not well taken. The statute is clear that the action 
must be against the distributees, not the Estate. 
R. 1755. Thus, the trial court ruled that Barbara's Motion to Reconvey the Homestead 
was against the estate, because the Children did not intervene until November 2005. As 
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such, putting the Children "on notice" was not "well taken" because the trial court viewed 
the Motion to Reconvey the Homestead as one against the Estate, not the Children. 
Because the trial court's August 2006 decision was based on its erroneous belief 
that a proceeding against the Children could not be undertaken unless they were made 
party defendants or had formally intervened, Barbara's briefing established that under the 
probate code, interested persons initiate proceedings for relief authorized in the probate 
code, including relief under Sections 75-3-909 and 75-3-1004, by filing a written pleading 
seeking relief and mailing a copy of the pleading to other "interested persons." 
Appellant's Brief at 13-17. Barbara's Motion to Reconvey the Homestead was filed "in" 
the estate case, but it was a proceeding "against" the Children. 
Persons interested in decedents' estates may apply to the registrar for 
determination in the informal proceedings provided in this chapter and may 
petition the court for orders in formal proceedings within the court's 
jurisdiction, including, but not limited to those described in this chapter. 
The court may hear and determine formal proceedings involving 
administration and distribution of decedents1 estates after notice to 
interested persons in conformity with Section 75-1-401. Persons notified are 
bound though less than all interested persons may have been given notice. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-3-105. Thus, Barbara refuted the trial court's reasoning. 
b. The Court of Appeals' Analysis Is Inequitable and Violates the Law of 
the Case. 
As shown, the Court misconstrued the trial court's ruling. The Court substituted 
its own analysis holding that Barbara's identification of herself as a creditor prevented her 
motion from being granted on remand. While Barbara identified herself as a creditor, and 
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not a devisee, it is inequitable to deny her motion on that ground. Both the personal 
representative and the Children filed memoranda in opposition to Barbara's motion. 
R.942-958 (personal representative's); R.959-967 (Children). Neither raised this defense. 
Given Utah's misnomer cases (excusing the failure to identify correctly a party to a case) 
and given the fact that the trial court and this Court sit as courts of equity, the Court 
should excuse Barbara's failure to wear her "devisee" hat in filing her motion. Wilcox v. 
Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 371 (Utah 1996); Hughes v. Cafferty, ^24, 89 P.3d 
148, 495 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 2004 UT 22 (Utah 2004); Utah Code Ann. §75-1-302(2). 
However, as noted above, to the extent Barbara's failure is fatal, that claim may not be 
raised on this second appeal. DeBry v. Cascade Enterprises, 935 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah 
1997). Having not raised it on the first appeal, the personal representative waived it. 
Comparing the trial court's Minute Entry with its August 10, 2006 Ruling shows it 
is contradicting itself. Compare R. 1079-80 with R. 1750-56. The Children opposed the 
Motion on the merits. R.959-967. Although opposing the motion, the personal 
representative expressly acknowledged in his response that Barbara "[was] a beneficiary 
under Lou!s will." R.942-948; see R.943 (acknowledgment). With regard to Barbara's 
motion and the personal representative's response, the Court stated in paragraph 17: 
"Merely mailing the Motion to Reconvey the Homestead to the PR without explaining 
that the motion was intended to constitute a proceeding against the Children, we 
explained, 'does not begin to satisfy the requirements of notice pleading.'" The language 
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quoted from Uzelac I had nothing to do with the Motion to Reconvey. In any event, Utah 
law does not require Barbara to tell the personal representative something that the 
personal representative could learn by reading the motion and its prayer for relief. His 
memorandum in opposition shows he understood the purpose of the Motion. R.942-58. 
The law of the case is designed to prevent precisely what is happening to Barbara. 
Kurt Vonnegut might enjoy the "catch 22" in which Barbara finds herself, but Barbara 
finds it incredibly unjust. The Court's decision in Uzelac II not only requires Barbara to 
defeat the trial court's contradictory legal conclusion (R.1755), but she must also defend 
her hard earned victory in Uzelac I as well. This Court should not be party to this 
injustice. 
c. The September 27,2003 Minute Entry. 
After selectively describing the trial court's reasoning in its Minute Entry in 
paragraph 6, the Court states in paragraph 7 that Uzelac I affirmed the trial court. It then 
inaccurately states that Uzelac I used the "marital estate analogue" in vacating the Minute 
Entry. As noted above, Uzelac I expressly rejected Judge Orme's marital estate analysis. 
Contrary to the Court's statement, Uzelac I vacated the trial court's Minute Entry and all 
other orders "based on its erroneous interpretation of the [Antenuptial] Agreement" alone. 
Uzelac I,1f2l. 
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3. Barbara, as a General Devisee, is Entitled to Payment of her Devise from the 
General Assets of the Estate. 
In paragraph 20, the Court holds that Barbara must be a pecuniary devisee in order 
to recover the distributed homestead. That is inaccurate. "A general devise is a 
testamentary disposition, usually of a specified amount of money or quantity of property, 
that is payable from the general assets of the estate'' Restatement (Third) of Property; 
Wills and Other Donative Transfers, §5.1 Classification Of Devises (1999) (emphasis 
added). As a general devisee, Barbara has a claim upon all of the assets of the estate that 
are not otherwise specifically devised. Utah Code Ann. §75-3-902(l)(d). The remainder 
interest in the Homestead is one of those assets. Her devise abates pro rata with other 
general devisees, such as the Children. Utah Code Ann. §75-3-902(l)(d) (text following 
(d)). 
4. Barbara is a General Pecuniary Devisee. 
a. The Court Misstated the Standard of Review. 
In paragraph 11, the Court held the classification of a devise is a mixed question of 
law and fact, requiring some deference to be given to the trial court's decision. However, 
when the facts are undisputed and based on documentary evidence, the proper standard of 
review is correction of error. Matter of Estate ofErickson, 806 P.2d 1186, 1189 (Utah 
1991). 
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b. Barbara Has Established She is a Pecuniary Devisee. 
In paragraph 20, the Court appears to view a general devise and a pecuniary devise 
as mutually exclusive. However, "[a] species of a general devise is a devise of a specified 
amount of money." Restatement (Third) of Prop.; Wills and Other Donative Transfers, 
§5.1 Classification of Devises, cmt. c (1999). The Court states that Barbara's entitlement 
to a dollar amount of judgment "alone" does not make the devise a pecuniary devise, but 
the Court never states what is missing in this case that would make the devise a pecuniary 
one, Without that analysis, the Court has not resolved the issue. 
Barbara's devise is a devise charged to specific property. f21. The specific 
property, being unavailable, she is a general devisee. Utah Code Ann. §75-3-902(l)(d) 
(text following (d)). To determine the amount of the devise, the trial court calculated the 
amount due Barbara under the Antenuptial Agreement, incorporated in the will, exactly 
like it would in any type of formula calculation. Restatement (Third) of Prop.; Wills and 
Other Donative Transfers, §5.1 Classification of Devises, cmt. c (1999). 
Had the specific property been in the estate, Barbara would have been entitled to 
that property as a specific devisee. Utah Code Ann. §75-3-902(l)(d) (text following (d)). 
As such, Barbara would have received all of the earnings and accretions on that property 
from Louis' date of death. Utah Code Ann. §22-3-201(1). Where the property is not 
available and the general devise is calculated as a specific dollar amount, it is only logical 
that it bear interest in partial compensation for the earnings that otherwise would have 
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accrued to Barbara had the property been available. Utah Code Ann. §75-3-904. Thus, 
the calculation of a dollar amount does not stand "alone." The calculated devise replaces 
a devise where Barbara would have received all of the earnings from Louis' date of death. 
5. The Court Made Other Errors. 
a. Barbara Is Not Required to Abandon her Life Estate. 
Footnote 2, paragraph 15, states in dicta that if the Homestead were reconveyed, 
Barbara would lose her life estate interest. That is incorrect. The Children would 
reconvey the remainder interest. Barbara does not have to give up her interest for the 
estate to sell the remainder interest in the Homestead. As a practical matter, Barbara 
believes it will enhance the value for all parties to sell both the life interest and the 
remainder interest. Regardless, Barbara is not required to give away her life interest with 
the sale of the remainder interest. In essence, the Court is chiding Barbara for wanting to 
receive the greatest benefit possible from her husband's estate. One would think the court 
would have some sympathy for an 81 year old widow of over 8 years who was entitled to 
$230,660.90 and is receiving nothing. 
b. Section 75-3-412 Only Applies to Formal Testamentary Orders. In 
dicta in paragraph 16, the Court states that Section 75-3-412 applies to Barbara's Motion 
to Reconvey the Homestead. That section states it only applies to "a formal testacy order 
under this part." Part 4 is titled "Formal Testacy and Appointment Proceedings." Section 
75-3-401 states that a "formal testacy proceeding is litigation to determine whether a 
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decedent left a valid will." Louis' will was admitted to probate without objection on 
December 7, 1999. R. 13-14. The Court's comment that Barbara's logic leads to the 
conclusion that the Minute Entry was a formal testacy order has no basis in fact, law, or 
logic. The only final testacy order in this case was entered on December 7, 1999 and 
became final on January 6, 2000. R. 13-14. 
Even assuming the Court's September 27, 2003 Minute Entry continued to be a 
valid and binding order after Uzelac I, Section 75-3-412 and 75-3-414 would never apply 
to that Minute Entry. Barbara's Motion to Reconvey did not seek a "formal testacy 
order." Rather, Section 75-1-308 governed the original appeal of the Minute Entry. 
Pursuant to that procedure, Uzelac I vacated the Minute Entry Order. 
The Court's misapplication of probate law will have pernicious consequences for 
future probate litigants. Since the Court of Appeals has now defined a motion to recover 
distributed property authorized under Sections 75-3-909, 75-3-1004, and 75-3-1006 as a 
"formal testacy order," litigants must appeal every order as a potential "formal testacy 
order" notwithstanding the language in Sections 75-3-401 and -412 to the contrary. 
Barbara asks the Court to delete this inaccurate statement of Utah law from its opinion. 
Conclusion 
If the Court grants this petition for rehearing, this is the practical effect of that 
ruling: 
a. Barbara's devise would be calculated with interest under Section 75-
3-904. 
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b. The Children would be required to return the remainder interest in the 
Homestead. 
c. The personal representative would sell that interest to raise money to pay 
Barbara's pecuniary devise. 
d. Barbara could choose to sell her life estate or not as she deemed advisable. 
e. Because both the devise to the Children and the devise to Barbara are 
general devises, each would abate pro-rata in order to pay the devises to the 
Children and the devise to Barbara. 
f. Upon completion of these tasks, the estate would be closed. 
Barbara submits this would be the correct result, and one that is far more reasonable and 
just than results from the Court's opinion. 
If the Court denies Barbara's motion for rehearing, she will be left to ponder why 
the panel in Uzelac I did not affirm the Minute Entry as requested by the personal 
representative. Had it done so, at least Barbara would have avoided three more years of 
effort and expense to obtain a worthless $230,660.90 devise. 
CERTIFICATION 
Charles M. Bennett certifies that this Petition has been filed in good faith and not 
for delay. 
Dated this Aj[ day of February, 2008. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
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Attorneys for Barbara B. Uzelac 
Page 14 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of BARBARA B. UZELAC'S 
PETITION FOR REHEARING were mailed by first class mail to the following 
persons, this / J day of February, 2008: 
Margaret H. Olson 
Hobbs & Olson 
466 East 500 South Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
with one courtesy copy to: 
Joseph G. Uzelac, Jr. 
6476 E Shooting Star Way 





In the Matter of the Estate of Louis J. Uzelac 
2008 UT App 33 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
In the matter of the Estate of 
Louis J. Uzelac. 
Barbara B. Uzelac, 
Plaintiff, Appellant and 
Cross-appellee, 
v. 
Joseph Uzelac Jr., as 
representative of the Estate, 
Defendant 
Susan Brooke Mageras and 




(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20060858-CA 
F I L E D 
( J a n u a r y 3 1 , 2008) 
2008 UT App 33 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 993901690 
The Honorable L.A. Dever 
Attorneys: Charles M. Bennett, Salt Lake City, for Appellant and 
Cross-appellee 
Margaret H. Olson, Salt Lake City, for Appellees and 
Cross-appellants 
Before Judges Greenwood, Davis, and McHugh. 
DAVIS, Judge: 
ll Appellant Barbara B. Uzelac (Wife) argues that the trial 
court, on remand from our prior review, see Uzelac v. Uzelac (In 
re Estate of Uzelac) (Uzelac I), 2005 UT App 234, K 25, 114 P.3d 
1164, erred in denying her motion to compel the return of Louis 
Uzelac's (Husband) premarital property (the Homestead) to his 
estate. Wife argues that the Homestead must be sold in order to 
pay for the $230,660.90 judgment in her favor assessed against 
the estate. Intervenors Susan Brooke Mageras and Allyson D. 
Uzelac (the Children) cross-appeal, arguing that the trial court 
erred by including Husband's payable on death (POD) accounts in 
the judgment calculations. We disagree with both parties and 
affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
12 Prior to Husband and Wife's marriage, they executed an Ante 
Nuptial Agreement (the Agreement). See id. 1 2. The Agreement 
provided that "all of the real, personal or mixed property owned 
by each party prior to their marriage shall be the sole and 
separate property of him or her or their respective estates." 
Under the Agreement, all marital property would "go to the 
survivor" if one spouse should predecease the other. The 
Agreement also provided Wife with "the right to reside in [the 
Homestead] for her lifetime, or such shorter time as she may 
elect." 
%3 Husband later prepared a will (the Will), dividing his 
estate as follows: "(1) all debts, expenses, and administration 
expenses are to be paid; (2) Husband's two daughters are to 
receive equal shares of Husband's property; (3) Wife is to 
receive property per the terms of the Agreement; and 
(4) Husband's two granddaughters are to receive $5000.00 each." 
Id. H 3. Specifically, the Will stated, "I give, devise and 
bequeath . . . to my children . . . all of my property, real 
mixed or personal, share and share alike . . . . [and t]o 
[W]ife . . . , she is to receive per the terms of [the 
Agreement] . . . ." 
1|4 Upon his death on November 6, 1999, "Husband had three [POD] 
accounts totaling $189,049.15 with his two daughters as 
beneficiaries, and one POD account totaling $12,790.00 with Wife 
as beneficiary." Id. ^ 5. Additionally, at his death Husband's 
non-POD accounts held funds totaling $75,876.85, and he had 
stocks worth $36,950.91. See id. 
i[5 The Personal Representative (the PR) distributed the estate 
as follows: Wife received a POD account "in [her] name," a life 
estate in the Homestead, and $4,858.83 from the couple's joint 
accounts, in addition to the $15,000.00 that was deposited in a 
joint account post-mortem. See id. *h 6. The Children received 
all other property, including the Homestead subject to Wife's 
life estate. See id. On July 28, 2003, Wife filed a Motion for 
an Order Directing Beneficiaries to Return Estate Property to the 
Estate, or in the Alternative Voiding the Deed of Distribution, 
(Motion to Reconvey the Homestead), arguing that the distribution 
violated the Agreement, which was incorporated by reference into 
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the Will, and that as a creditor, her claims must be paid before 
those of the Children. 
%6 The trial court found "no basis for [Wife]'s request," 
denying the motion on two grounds. First, to claim creditor 
status, Wife was required to file a "written demand" with the PR 
within "two years of the death of [Husband]," Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-6-107 (1993), which the trial court found that she had 
failed to do. As we explained in Uzelac I, "[m]erely providing 
the PR with a copy of the Agreement, which all parties have 
always agreed is binding, without explaining how the Agreement 
had been breached or the amount [Wife] was claiming as a creditor 
under the Agreement, does not begin to satisfy the requirements 
of notice pleading." Uzelac I, 2005 UT App 234, 1 14, 114 P.3d 
1164. Second, Wife's argument that the PR breached his duty to 
administer in accordance with the rights of the claimants failed 
because the PR had given Wife a life estate in the Homestead, as 
required by the Agreement, while giving the Children the 
remaining rights to the Homestead as provided for in the Will. 
f7 In Uzelac I we affirmed the trial court, rejecting Wife's 
claim brought as a creditor because such a claim against the 
estate was time-barred under Utah Code section 75-3-803 due to 
insufficient notice pleading. See id. ^[ 11-14. However, using 
the analogue of a marital estate from our divorce jurisprudence, 
we vacated the trial court's rulings and remanded, instructing 
the trial court to determine the amount owed to Wife as 
beneficiary per the Agreement. See id. |^f 20-21. We also 
ordered the trial court to "determin[e] . . . what property of 
Husband's is available to satisfy her claim." Id. % 21. 
%8 On remand, the parties stipulated that "the only property 
acquired by [Husband] that is subject to [Wife's] claim is the 
cash (including stocks) on hand at his death." The parties also 
stipulated that there was $277,716.00 in cash on deposit1 and 
nine stocks Husband held at his death. The court assessed the 
value of those stocks that had been acquired after marriage at 
Notwithstanding our marital estate analogue in Uzelac v. 
Uzelac (In re Estate of Uzelac) (Uzelac I), 2005 UT App 234, 114 
P.3d 1164, neither party addresses the source of these funds 
(i.e. pre-marital or post-marital) in the trial court or on 
appeal. Thus, we do not address it. See Monson v. Carver, 928 
P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996) (declining to address certain claims 
because of "our general rule that 'issues not raised at trial 
cannot be argued for the first time on appeal'" (quoting State v. 
Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994))); State v. Jennings, 875 
P.2d 566, 569 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (refusing to consider 
issues not argued in the appellant's brief). 
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$27,747.33, resulting in a subtotal of $305,463.33. The trial 
court then deducted $74,802.43 from this sum for a gift from 
Husband to Wife, a POD account in Wife's name at the time of the 
marriage (minus an insurance claim), and an account in Husband's 
name. Thus, the trial court found that there was $230,660.90 in 
"after acquired property" and concluded that Wife was entitled to 
that amount. However, the trial court further concluded that 
Wife as barred from recovering the $23 0,66 0.90 by Utah Code 
section 75-3-1006 because Wife did not commence a proceeding 
against the Children within the time specified by the statute of 
limitations. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1006 (1992). 
1)9 The trial court also determined, citing the Restatement of 
Property, see Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills and Other 
Donative Transfers § 5.1 cmt. c (1999), that the Children were 
general devisees due to the "all of my property" language in the 
Will, and not residuary devisees. The trial court further noted 
that the Will "does not have a residuary clause." 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1|l0 Wife contends that the court improperly denied her Motion to 
Reconvey the Homestead, arguing that this motion amounted to a 
proceeding against the Children. Whether the trial court erred 
in interpreting Utah statutes to deny a motion is a question of 
law, which is reviewed for correctness. See In re VKS, 2003 UT 
App 13, 1 7, 63 P.3d 1284. 
fll Wife argues next that her 2003 Motion to Reconvey the 
Homestead should have been granted because the Children were 
residual devisees and she is a general pecuniary devisee. If the 
trial court had agreed with Wife that the Children are residuary 
devisees and that she is a general pecuniary devisee, Wife's 
$230,660.90 claim against the estate must be satisfied before the 
estate can satisfy the Children's claims under the Will. See 
generally Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills and Other Donative 
Transfers § 5.1 (1999). Given the financial situation, this 
would mean the Children would have to reconvey the Homestead to 
the estate. The categorization of devisees is a mixed question 
of fact and law; we accord some deference to the trial court. 
See Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, 1 57, 82 P.3d 1076; 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937-38 (Utah 1994) . 
fl2 The Children cross-appeal and argue that the trial court 
improperly included POD accounts in determining "the amount owed 
to Wife as a beneficiary under the Will as per the Agreement," 
Uzelac I, 2005 UT App 234, H 21, 114 P.3d 1164. We review a 
trial court's interpretation of our unambiguous order for 
correctness. See Bettincrer v. Bettinger, 793 P.2d 389, 391 (Utah 
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Ct. App. 1990). "However, if the trial court determines the 
language of an order is ambiguous and finds facts based upon 
extrinsic evidence, our review of those findings is limited to 
determining whether they are clearly erroneous." Southwick v. 
Leone (In re Estate of Leone), 860 P.2d 973, 975 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) (citing Bettinger, 793 P.2d at 392). 
ANALYSIS 
I. The Homestead 
1(13 Wife argues that she did initiate a proceeding against the 
Children and thereby is not time-barred from recovering against 
the estate via a reconveyance and sale of the Homestead. She 
cites Utah Code section 75-3-105(1), which states that " [p]ersons 
interested in decedents' estates may . . . petition the court for 
orders in formal proceedings within the court's jurisdiction, 
including, but not limited to those described in this chapter." 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-105(1) (1993). Specifically, Wife argues 
that the Motion to Reconvey the Homestead, which was filed 
against the estate (and served on the Children and the PR), was 
not subject to section 75-3-803's time bar because it served as 
notice under section 75-1-401, a pleading under section 75-3-
105(1), and a proceeding under section 75-3-106 against the 
Children. We disagree. 
1[l4 The Utah Probate Code defines a "formal proceeding" as a 
"proceeding [] conducted before a judge with notice to interested 
persons." Id. § 75-1-201(18) (Supp. 2007). "Each proceeding 
before the court or registrar is independent of any other 
proceeding involving the same estate," id. § 75-3-106 (1) (a) 
(1993), even though " [p]etitions for formal orders of the court 
may combine various requests for relief in a single proceeding," 
id. § 75-3-106 (1) (b) . 
1l5 The trial court ruled that "the action must be against [the 
Children], not the [e]state," that "[i]t is clear that no 
proceedings against either of the distributees of the real 
property requested by [Wife] to be recovered has been 
instituted," and that the Wife's argument that "her claim as a 
creditor of the estate was sufficient to put [the Children] on 
notice is not well taken." In order for the Children to be 
placed on sufficient notice, "the written statement of claim must 
at least describe 'the general nature of the obligation,* as 
measured by the 'notice pleading standard' under rule eight of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Uzelac I, 2005 UT App 234, 
f 13 (quoting Ouinn v. Quinn, 772 P.2d 979, 980 (Utah Ct. App. 
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1989)). Therefore, we agree with the trial court that no 
proceeding was brought against the Children.2 
fl6 Even if the Motion to Reconvey the Homestead were a 
proceeding under the Utah Probate Code, a formal testacy order 
resulting from a proceeding is generally final "as to all persons 
with respect to all issues concerning the decedent's estate that 
the court considered," subject to appeal. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-
412(1) (1993). The denial of the Motion to Reconvey the 
Homestead on September 29, 2003, if we followed Wife's logic, 
would be deemed a formal testacy order. Because final orders by 
a court probating a will are subject to the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, see id. § 75-1-308, Wife had thirty days to 
appeal the denial of her motion. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a). Yet 
Wife filed her notice of appeal on September 19, 2006, nearly 
three years after the denial. 
%11 Wife argues that her claim remains timely due to our remand 
in Uzelac I, which she contends vacated the initial determination 
that Wife's claim was time-barred. However, the 2003 motion was 
premised on Wife's status as creditor, and we previously held 
that "even assuming that Wife would otherwise qualify as a 
creditor, her claim is barred by the one-year limitation in 
section 75-3-803." Uzelac I, 2005 UT App 234, f 14, 114 P.3d 
1164. Merely mailing the Motion to Reconvey the Homestead to the 
PR without explaining that the motion was intended to constitute 
a proceeding against the Children, we explained, "does not begin 
to satisfy the requirements of notice pleading." Id. Moreover, 
"[t]he fact that the court retained jurisdiction . . . to 
adjudicate further matters did not leave open for reconsideration 
the question as to" whether the Homestead should be sold to 
satisfy Wife's claims. Havward v. Voorhees (In re Estate of 
Voorhees), 366 P.2d 977, 980 (Utah 1961). "There was nothing 
further to be decided on that particular issue . . . . That 
being so, the decree entered thereon was final and therefore 
appealable. Since [Wife] took no appeal within the time allowed 
by law, that decree is conclusive." Id. (footnote omitted). 
2We note that if the property were reconveyed and sold at 
Wife's behest, her life estate in the Homestead would have no 
value because she loses her possessory interest in the Homestead 
the moment she moves out for a sale. Cf. Jeffs v. Stubbsf 970 
P.2d 1234, 1242 n.6 (Utah 1998) ("Because the . . . 
claimants . . . could occupy the land for their lives, so long as 
they did not sell, mortgage, or abandon the property, the 
claimants' interest is actually a life estate subject to a 
condition subsequent."). 
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1fl8 Furthermore, even if we were to hold that Wife's motion was 
a proceeding and was timely, the estate would have no right to 
the Homestead by extension of our marital estate analogue. See 
generally Uzelac I, 2005 UT App 234, % 20. In a divorce context, 
even absent an agreement, "premarital property is considered 
separate property and will be retained by the party who brought 
it into the marriage." Rappleve v. Rappleve, 855 P.2d 260, 263 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1320 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990)). Here, Wife and Husband contracted to keep 
their premarital property separate as part of the Agreement. See 
Uzelac If 2005 UT App 234, *h 18. Therefore, we affirm the trial 
court's denial of Wife's motion and hold that the estate has no 
right to the Homestead. 
II. Classification of Devisees 
fl9 Wife next argues that the court erred in categorizing the 
Children as general devisees. Rather, Wife contends, the Will 
and the Agreement treat her as a general pecuniary devisee and 
the Children as residuary devisees. This would mean, Wife 
argues, that the Homestead would have to be reconveyed to the 
estate and sold in order to satisfy her claim against the estate, 
as well as to give her prejudgment interest.3 We disagree. 
f20 A pecuniary devise is a testamentary gift of a specified sum 
of money, either a particular dollar amount or "a formula from 
which a sum of money is derived." Restatement (Third) of Prop.: 
Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 5.1 cmt. c (1999). The 
pecuniary devises in this Will are the $5,000.00 each to two 
grandchildren. While the trial court on remand determined a 
dollar amount that Wife is entitled to under the Agreement, this 
alone does not, contrary to Wife's assertions, make the devise 
pecuniary. See id. ("Any devise that is payable out of the 
general assets of the estate is a general devise. For example, a 
devise of 'all of my property' or of 'all of my personal 
property' is a general devise, as is a devise of 'one-half of my 
estate.'").4 Because Wife is not a pecuniary devisee, her 
3The trial court on remand found that the "[d]ate of 
judgment is the appropriate starting place for interest since 
this is an action on the interpretation of [the Agreement] rather 
than a general pecuniary devise as alleged by [Wife]." Since we 
agree with the trial court that Wife is not a pecuniary devisee, 
we accordingly affirm the lower court's ruling that "[t]he 
requirements for imposition of pre-judgment interest have not 
been met." 
4While "the Official Comment to Uniform Probate Code § 2-604 
(continued...) 
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judgment against the estate does not entitle her to the 
reconveyance and sale of the Homestead to satisfy her claim. Cf. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-902(2) (Supp. 2007) (giving, for purposes 
of abatement, a pecuniary devisee "a general devise to the extent 
of the failure or insufficiency" of that particular property 
devised). 
i|21 Our prior analysis of the Will and the Agreement determined 
that it was Husband's and Wife's intention "to [keep] property 
Husband and Wife brought into the marriage [separate], not 
property they obtained during the marriage." Uzelac I. 2005 UT 
App 234, H 18. As such, both the Children and Wife are general 
devisees, but to separate property--items acquired before and 
after Husband's and Wife's marriage in April 1976, respectively. 
To hold otherwise would run counter to Husband's intent, which is 
the foundation for any interpretation of testamentary documents. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-102(2)(b) (1993); In re Estate of 
Kleinman, 970 P.2d 1286, 1288-89 (Utah 1998). Thus, we affirm 
the trial court's ruling that the Children are general devisees 
as well.5 
III. Calculating Wife's Claim Against the Estate 
1J22 On cross-appeal, the Children argue that the trial court 
improperly included POD accounts when calculating the amount of 
Wife's claim under the Agreement. Specifically, they argue that 
because POD accounts are outside the probate estate, they are not 
"held at death" and, therefore, Wife is not entitled to these 
monies. 
f23 A POD account is one "payable on request to one person 
during lifetime and on that person's death to one or more POD 
payees." Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-101(10) (Supp. 2007); see also 
id. § 75-6-110 (1993). POD accounts are held outside of probate 
and transfer upon death to the payee. See Southwick v. Leone (In 
re Estate of Leone), 860 P.2d 973, 976 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
("Utah law explicitly provides that [POD] accounts are 
non-testamentary contracts."). This notwithstanding, using the 
marital estate analogue, we instructed the trial court to 
4(...continued) 
treats [a devise of 'all of my property' or of 'one-half of my 
estate'] as a residuary devise," the code does so in the narrow 
context of "the special antilapse rule of that section." 
Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills and Other Donative Transfers 
§ 5.1 Reporter's Note, cmt. c (1999). 
5While the trial court did not explicitly rule that Wife was 
a general devisee, it treated her as such. We affirm this 
implicit ruling. 
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"determin[e] . . . what property of Husband's is available to 
satisfy [Wife's] claim under the Agreement." Uzelac I, 2005 App 
234, % 21, 114 P.3d 1164. Under the Agreement, Wife is entitled 
to all of Husband's assets acquired during their marriage. 
K24 The parties stipulated to the amount of $277,716.00 in 
Husband's accounts at the time of his death, and none of the 
parties introduced any evidence suggesting that these amounts 
were not acquired during the marriage. Thus, it appears that the 
parties essentially agreed that all $277,716.00 was acquired 
after Wife's marriage to Husband or otherwise intended to be part 
of Wife's claim against the estate. Under these circumstances, 
we cannot say the finding of the trial court that the sum to Wife 
was "after acquired property" was clearly erroneous. See Utah 
Labor Relations Bd. v. Broadway Shoe Repairing Co., 120 Utah 585, 
236 P. 2d 1072, 1076 (1951) (upholding an agency factual finding 
where the "finding [was] reasonably deducible from the evidence 
and the parties had a fair opportunity to refute it"). We 
therefore affirm the trial court's calculation of Wife's claim. 
CONCLUSION 
125 We affirm the trial court's denial of Wife's Motion to 
Reconvey the Homestead to satisfy the Wife's claims. We also 
affirm the trial court's classification of the Children and Wife 
as general devisees. Further, we affirm the trial court's 
finding on the amount of Wife's claim. Thus, "the case [has] 
effectively end[ed] because no money [is] available to pay 
[Wife's] claims against the estate . . . --the only remaining 
business in this case, according to the record." Kelly v. West 
One Trust Co. (In re Estate of Morrison), 933 P.2d 1015, 1017 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
H26 WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 




In re Estate of Uzelac 
114 P.3d 1164,526 Utah Adv. Rep. 33,2005 UT App 234 
In re Estate of Uzelac 
114 P.3d 1164, 526 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 2005 UT App 234 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
[^1 Barbara Uzelac (Wife) appeals from a trial court order denying her certain property under an 
Ante Nuptial Agreement (the Agreement). We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part. 
BACKGROUND 
f2 On April 14, 1976, Wife and Louis J. Uzelac (Husband) were married. Prior to their marriage, 
Husband and Wife executed the Agreement, which provides, in relevant part: 
In the event of the termination of this marriage by death or otherwise all of the real, personal or 
mixed property owned by each party prior to their marriage shall be the sole and separate 
property of him or her or their respective estates. 
In the event that either party to this Agreement should sell, convert or exchange any of the 
property owned by him or her prior to the marriage, then the proceeds from such sale or 
exchange or such other real or personal property acquired from such sale shall be deemed 
subject to this Agreement, not as property acquired during the marriage, but as substitute 
property owned by the party prior to marriage. 
The parties further agree that all property, whether real, personal or mixed acquired by the 
parties shall go to the survivor, in the event of the death of the other, or if otherwise 
terminated, shall be equitably divided as the parties may agree or as may be decreed by a 
court of competent jurisdiction. 
In the event of the simultaneous death of the parties all property acquired by them during 
their marriage, be it real, personal or mixed shall be divided one-half to [Wife's] estate 
and one-half to [Husband's] estate. 
f 3 After Husband and Wife were married, Husband prepared a will (Will), which directs that 
Husband's estate is to be divided as follows: (1) all debts, expenses, and administration expenses 
are to be paid; (2) Husband's two daughters are to receive equal shares of Husband's property; (3) 
Wife is to receive property per the terms of the Agreement; and (4) Husband's two 
granddaughters are to receive $5000.00 each. It is undisputed that both the Agreement and the 
Will are enforceable. 
^4 At the time Husband and Wife were married, Husband owned (1) two parcels of real property, 
on which Husband and Wife resided at the time of his death (Residence); (2) six water shares in 
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company; and (3) $52,012.42 in his bank account. During their 
marriage, both Husband and Wife kept numerous separate bank accounts and deposited most of 
the money they acquired during the marriage into their respective separate accounts. 
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H5 On November 6, 1999, Husband died. At the time of his death, Husband had three "payable 
on death" (POD) accounts totaling $189,049.15 with his two daughters as beneficiaries, and one 
POD account totaling $12,790.00 with Wife as beneficiary. In addition, Husband had non-POD 
accounts totaling $75,876.85 and stocks worth $36,950.91. On December 7, 1999, the Will 
entered into probate. 
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| 6 Wife received the $12,790.00 from the POD account to which she was a beneficiary; a life 
estate in the Residence pursuant to the Agreement; $4858.83 from Husband and Wife's joint 
accounts; and $15,000.00 withdrawn from one of Husband's accounts prior to his death and 
deposited after his death into the joint account. Husband's two daughters received all other 
property owned by Husband at the time of his death, including the Residence subject to Wife's 
life estate. 
T[7 Wife challenged this distribution on numerous grounds, essentially arguing that under the 
Agreement she is entitled to all property Husband acquired during the marriage. After a bench 
trial, the trial court did not disturb the distribution, ruling that the Agreement provides that Wife 
is to receive only the property Husband and Wife acquired jointly and held together during the 
marriage. Wife appeals. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1] f 8 First, Wife argues that she qualifies as a creditor under Utah Code sections 75-3-801 to 
-816, which give priority to her claims under the Agreement. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-801 
to-816 (2000). Interpretation of statutes presents a question of law we review for correctness. See 
In re V.K.S., 2003 UT App 13, ^ 7, 63 P.3d 1284. 
[2] TJ9 Second, Wife argues that the trial court erred by interpreting the Agreement to provide that 
Wife receives only property Husband and Wife acquired together and held jointly during their 
marriage. We review a trial court's interpretation of a contract for correctness. See Nova Cas. Co. 
v. Able Constr., Inc., 1999 UT 69, f 6, 983 P.2d 575. 
[3] 1J10 Finally, Wife argues that the trial court erred by ruling that Husband's daughters had not 
waived their rights to certain personal property. Where the facts are undisputed, "the proper 
standard of waiver presents a legal question which is reviewed for correctness." Pledger v. 
Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, U 16, 982 P.2d 572. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Wife's Status as a Creditor 
[4] T[l 1 Wife first argues that she is a creditor, as defined in Utah Code sections 75-3-801 to 
-816, which gives priority to her claims. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-801 to -816. The personal 
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representative of Husband's estate (PR) argues that any claim Wife may have had as a creditor is 
now barred by the one-year time limitation in Utah Code section 75-3-803. We agree with the 
PR. 
[^12 Under section 75-3-803, a creditor must bring a claim, at the latest, "one year after the 
decedent's death." Id. § 75-3-803(l)(a). Because Wife filed her breach of contract claim over two 
years after Husband's death, her claim falls outside the one-year limitation. 
f 13 Wife argues that although she did not formally bring her claim for over two years, she did 
present her claim to the PR within the one-year limitation by providing the PR a copy of the 
Agreement. Section 75-3-804(1 )(a) provides that a claimant need not commence a court action to 
comply with the one-year limitation, but rather "may deliver or mail to the personal 
representative, or the personal representative's attorney of record, a written statement of the claim 
indicating its basis, the name and address of the claimant, and the amount claimed." Id. § 
75-3-804(l)(a). Further, the written statement of claim must at least describe "the general nature 
of the obligation," as measured by the "notice pleading standard" under rule 8 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Quinn v. Quinn, 772 P.2d 979, 980 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (quotations omitted) 
(citing Dementas v. Estate of Tallas, 764 P.2d 628, 630 (Utah Ct.App.1988)). 
T}14 Merely providing the PR with a copy of the Agreement, which all parties have always agreed 
is binding, without explaining how the Agreement had been breached or the amount she was 
claiming as a creditor under the Agreement, does not begin to satisfy the requirements of notice 
pleading. Wife's failure to give the PR notice of the amount she was claiming as a creditor or 
what her theory of recovery as a creditor was * 1168 under the Agreement prejudiced the PR as 
he proceeded to treat her as a beneficiary and thus took actions which were contrary to her now 
claimed status. Thus, even assuming that Wife would otherwise qualify as a creditor, her claim is 
barred by the one-year limitation in section 75-3-803. 
II. Interpretation of the Agreement 
[5] f^l5 Wife argues that the trial court erred by construing the language of the Agreement, "all 
property... acquired by the parties," to mean all property acquired together by the parties. The PR 
argues that the trial court's interpretation is correct, and thus, under the Agreement Wife is 
entitled only to the property jointly acquired and held by Husband and Wife at the time of 
Husband's death. We agree with Wife. 
[6][7][8] f 16 "The underlying purpose in construing or interpreting a contract is to ascertain the 
intentions of the parties to the contract." WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 
UT 88, U 17, 54 P.3d 1139. When interpreting a contract, "[w]e look to the writing itself to 
ascertain the parties' intentions, and we consider each contract provision ... in relation to all of the 
others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none." Id. at ^ 18 (alterations in 
original) (quotations and citation omitted). "If the language within the four corners of the contract 
is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual 
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language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." Id. at f 19 (quotations and 
citation omitted). 
1fl7 The disputed language from the Agreement is as follows: 
The parties further agree that all property, whether real, personal or mixed acquired by the parties 
shall go to the survivor, in the event of the death of the other, or if otherwise terminated, shall be 
equitably divided as the parties may agree or as may be decreed by a court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
The PR argues that when read in light of the surrounding clauses, it is evident that this language 
must be read as "property acquired by the parties together shall go to the survivor," which would 
mean that Wife is not entitled to property Husband acquired on his own and kept in separate 
accounts. The surrounding clauses are as follows: 
In the event of the termination of this marriage by death or otherwise all of the real, personal or 
mixed property owned by each party prior to their marriage shall be the sole and separate 
property of him or her or their respective estates. 
In the event that either party to this Agreement should sell, convert or exchange any of the 
property owned by him or her prior to the marriage, then the proceeds from such sale or exchange 
or such other real or personal property acquired from such sale shall be deemed subject to this 
Agreement, not as property acquired during the marriage, but as substitute property owned by the 
party prior to marriage. 
Tfl8 The PR argues that these clauses demonstrate that the parties intended to keep their assets 
separate so that their marriage would not undermine their intention that certain property transfer 
to their children. Wife argues that these clauses demonstrate this intention was only as to 
property Husband and Wife brought into the marriage, not property they obtained during the 
marriage. We agree with Wife. The surrounding clauses merely make clear that the property 
acquired during the marriage is to be treated differently and is to go to the survivor. 
Tfl9 The plain meaning of "acquired by the parties" in this context also cuts against the PR's 
reading. In divorce cases, we have consistently interpreted language such as "acquired by the 
parties during marriage" to mean all property either party acquires, whether held in separate 
accounts or not. Jefferies v. Jefferies, 895 P.2d 835, 837 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (using "acquired by 
the parties during marriage" to mean property acquired by either party or both); see also Elman v. 
Elman, 2002 UT App 83,1j 38, 45 P.3d 176 (same). 
f20 Because the contested language also speaks of property "acquired by the parties" in the event 
of termination of the marriage for reasons other than death, we must assume *1169 that it has the 
same plain meaning it has in the divorce context. We conclude the plain language of the 
Agreement provides that Wife is entitled to all property acquired during the marriage and held at 
Husband's death. 
TJ21 We vacate all orders previously entered by the trial court based on its erroneous 
interpretation of the Agreement including the order of September 27, 2003. We remand for the 
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trial court to determine, under our interpretation of the Agreement, the amount owed to Wife as a 
beneficiary under the Will as per the Agreement. We also remand for a determination of what 
property of Husbandfs is available to satisfy her claim under the Agreement. [FN2] 
FN2. We do not concur in Judge Orme's concurring opinion. The issue discussed therein was 
not before the court, we did not address it, and it should not be considered the law of the case. 
We leave it to the trial court to determine what is "all property acquired during the marriage and 
held at Husband's death." 
III. Waiver 
[9] f22 Wife argues that the trial court erred by failing to recognize the PR's waiver of rights to 
certain personal property. The PR argues that the trial court did not err because it merely required 
a verbal waiver to be reduced to writing before recognizing it. We agree with Wife. 
Tf23 During the trial, one of Husband's daughters stated that she was interested in receiving only 
nine items of Husband's personal property. When asked whether the PR was waiving claim to all 
other items of personal property, his attorney stated that Wife could keep "everything else." After 
trial, the PR failed to include this waiver in the draft order, and Wife objected to the order on that 
basis. The court entered the order over Wife's objection, stating that the PR could file a separate 
written waiver if he chose. 
[ 10][ 11][12] ^24 The trial court erred by refusing to recognize the waiver to personal property 
made in open court. "A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. To constitute a 
waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit, or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and 
an intention to relinquish it. [The relinquishment] must be distinctly made, although it may be 
express or implied." Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah 
1993) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The PR's statement that Wife could keep all 
items of personal property except those specifically identified by Husband's daughter meets all 
these requirements. Therefore, the trial court erred by refusing to recognize the PR's waiver. 
CONCLUSION 
[^25 Because Wife brought her claim as a creditor after the one-year limitation period had 
expired, the trial court did not err by refusing to recognize Wife's claims as a creditor. However, 
the trial court did err by construing the Agreement to entitle Wife only to property Husband and 
Wife acquired and held together during marriage. Also, the trial court erred by failing to 
recognize the PR's waiver to certain personal property. Accordingly, we affirm in part and 
reverse and remand in part. 
%L61 CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge. 
ORME, Judge (concurring): 
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|^27 I concur in the lead opinion and agree that Wife, as the surviving spouse, is entitled under the 
agreement to all marital property not otherwise dealt with in the agreement, including property 
Husband acquired during the marriage. However, I write separately to draw the trial court's 
attention to the general rule, not mentioned in the lead opinion, that any appreciation of, or 
interest on, premarital property is separate property and not part of the marital estate. See Dunn v. 
Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314,1320 (Utah Ct.App.1990) ("The general rule is that equity requires that 
each party retain the separate property he or she brought into the marriage, including any 
appreciation of the separate property."). There are some exceptions to this rule, see, e.g., Burt v. 
Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct.App.1990), but if none of the exceptions apply, the trial 
court must, in *1170 determining what Wife is entitled to under the Agreement, ensure that any 
interest on, or appreciation of, Husband's premarital property is regarded as his separate property 
rather than as property acquired during the marriage. 
[^28 I go out of my way to make this point not because I see any suggestion to the contrary in the 
lead opinion, but only because I gather from comments made at oral argument that Wife's 
counsel may hope to employ an approach on remand that reflects a different view. Specifically, it 
was mentioned that certain bank accounts were in a particular amount at the time of marriage and 
were several times larger at the time of Husband's death. The implication seemed to be that the 
difference was property acquired during the marriage to which Wife would be entitled. This 
approach ignores the general rule I have highlighted. In actuality, Wife would only be entitled to 
the difference net of the interest attributable to Husband's premarital principal. 
T|291 must also offer a couple of comments about footnote 2 of the lead opinion, the addition of 
which is what prompted our issuance of an Amended Opinion in this case. This footnote was 
added in response to Wife's petition for rehearing, which was aimed solely at my separate 
opinion. The thrust of the petition was that equitable principles used in making property 
distributions in divorce cases are inapplicable here. As to footnote 2, my colleagues are right: the 
issue I have highlighted was not before the trial court, given the erroneous interpretation it made 
of the Agreement; the majority chose not to address it; and as my comment is that of a single 
appellate judge, it surely is not "the law of the case." All of that having been said, it is far from 
aberrational for such a viewpoint to be expressed. On the contrary, appellate courts often 
will-and often should—comment on matters likely to come before the trial court on remand. See, 
e.g., Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, ^  22, 20 P.3d 388 (stating that "where an 
appellate court finds that it is necessary to remand a case for further proceedings, it has the duty 
of'pass[ing] on matters which may then become material'") (citation omitted). Such comments 
are necessarily advisory only, as the appellate court can do little more than guess at how the 
proceedings on remand will unfold. 
TJ30 As to the main point made in the petition for rehearing, I can only observe that the lead 
opinion itself, in developing the interpretative analysis that leads to Wife's success on Issue II, 
relies-and appropriately so-on two divorce cases. It seems obvious that divorce cases will be the 
lodestar of jurisprudence concerning marital property, whether it be on the question of what the 
phrase "acquired by the parties" means or the question of how to treat interest earned or 
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appreciation accrued during marriage on a spouse's separate property. Were I the trial judge 
responsible to sort this all out on remand, I would be quite skeptical about the proposition that 
the rules defining marital property vary considerably, depending on the legal context in which 
such issues arise. 
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